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ARGUMENT 
I. THE ISSUE IN THIS CASE IS THE MEANING OF "ALL COSTS 
OF COLLECTION." 
In its Brief, the Amicus has attempted to redefine the issue in this case. In this 
Court's letter to the Amicus1, this Court itself defined the issue as "what is the 
meaning of 'all costs of collection"' as used in U.C.A. 7-15-l(7)(b)(iii). 
For the Amicus to attempt to frame this matter as one of abuse of discretion 
is at best off point, and at worst an attempt to mislead the Court and fog the issues 
to provide a cover for the Appellee where none exists. Checkrite will address the 
issue of abuse of discretion later in this Reply Brief, but from the outset Checkrite 
states that the issue is what this Court said it is. 
The Amicus cites Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1999 Utah App. 80, 
977 P.2d 508) as its case in chief. The Amicus cites only a portion of the relevant 
language in its brief. In somewhat misleading terms, on page 2, in the last sentence, 
the Amicus quotes "the allowance or disallowance of a particular item as a cost 
falls withing the sound discretion of the trial court." (citations omitted.) Amicus 
does not recite the entire sentence. The full sentence, which puts the holding and 
relevance of Stevenett in a different light, states that "When no statute governs a 
1
 A copy of the Court's letter is attached as Addendum "A". 
1 
particular item of expense, the allowance or disallowance of a particular item as a 
cost falls within the sound discretion of the trial court." Stevenett, at 516. 
(emphasis added). The language addressing a governing statute is key to this 
matter, as what is at issue is the definition of specific statutory terms. The 
"particular items" in Stevenett were allowed as far as they were provided for by 
statute or rule. Stevenett is a personal injury case, and the issue is one of whether 
mediation expenses are distinguished from litigation expenses, and therefore taxable 
as costs. They are not. 977 P.2d at 517. Stevenett also discusses statutory costs 
and costs under Rule 54(d)(1), U.R.C.P. 
Rule 54, U.R.C.P., provides the framework for awarding costs in a 
judgment. Rule 54(d)(1) and (2) state that when a statute expressly provides for 
payment of costs, as U.C.A. 7-15-1 provides, they are awardable, and provide the 
formalities for putting those costs before the Court. 
In the instant matter, it is clear that particular costs of collection are 
specifically allowed under the relevant statute. What is at issue is the interpretation 
of" all costs of collection", not whether those costs are allowable. Statutory 
interpretation is not discretionary; it is a matter of law.2 The statute which is at 
2
 See, e.g., Graham v. Davis County Solid Waste Management and 
Energy Recovery Special Service District, 1999 UT App. 136, 979 P.2d 363; Jeffs 
v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 351 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1998); Rehn v. Rehn, 1999 
2 
issue in this appeal specifically allows "all costs of collection." Tholen v. Sandy 
City, 849 P.2d 592 at 595, (Utah Ct. App 1993), footnote 2. 
In Stevenett and the other cases cited by the Amicus, costs are clearly 
allowable if the relevant statute provides for the payment thereof. What is being 
sought here are not litigation costs, (that is, witness' costs, court costs and 
attorney's fees), which are allowable at any rate under statute, but Checkrite's 
actual costs of collection, the definition of which is the issue in this matter before 
the court. 
II DESPITE AMICUS' ARGUMENT TO THE CONTRARY, THOLEN 
V. SANDYCITYIS ON POINT AND IS DISPOSITIVE.3 
The issues between this appeal and Tholen are different, but the relevance of 
Tholen is the discussion by the Court of Appeals, in particular, the language in 
which the Court of Appeals demonstrates that costs of collection in a debt 
collection context are different from costs of collection in litigation. The Court of 
Appeals used the example of the Utah Bad Check law to show that the legislature 
UT App. 41, 974 P. 2d 306; Child v. Newsome, 892 P.2d 9,10, (Utah 1995). 
3
 Checkrite notes and apologizes to the Court for the misspelling of 
Tholen in it's Brief. Checkrite repeatedly spelled Tholen as Thoren, and 
recognizes the error. However, all the citations to Tholen are correct, and 
Checkrite's spelling error in no way changes the applicability of that case to the 
instant case. 
3 
has a different meaning in mind for bad check collections than for routine civil 
litigation. 
" . . . Moreover, attorney fees should not be confused with the more generic 
term 'costs' because without specific statutory language, costs do not 
include attorney fees. This is especially true in light of other instances where 
the Utah Legislature has expressly authorized the award of attorney fees, 
sometime explicitly distinguishing fees from costs." (Citations omitted.) See 
e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-l(3)(c) (Supp. 1992) (person issuing bad check 
is liable for "all costs of collection, including all court costs and reasonable 
attorneys fee." Tholen, at 596. 
Checkrite refers the Court to Appellant's Brief, pages 14-15 for a more thorough 
discussion. 
Tholen deals with the allowance of attorney's fees. To distinguish this 
matter, and to further show the relevance of Tholen, Checkrite points out that in 
U.C.A. 7-15-1, et seq., attorney's fees are specifically allowed. The issue in this 
appeal is whether the language of the statute limits recoverable costs to only court 
costs and attorney's fees. Again, it is Checkrite's position that the statutory 
language at issue is not language of limitation or exclusion, but one of a broader 
inclusion. This position is the same position that the Court of Appeals took in 
Tholen. Checkrite again refers the Court to Appellant's Brief, pages 14-20 for a 
more complete discussion. 
4 
III. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT PERMIT THE AMICUS TO 
REDEFINE THE ISSUE. 
Amicus' argument that the only issue properly before the Court is abuse of 
discretion is not correct. To begin with, this case is an appeal from a final order 
and judgment of a District Court, and is therefore appealable under Rules 3 and 4 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Title II.4 The entire hearing before the 
District Court was on an objection to the Clerks' denial of a Certificate of Default. 
While abuse of discretion is an issue that this Court may wish to address, it is not 
the issue here. It is Checkrite's position that there was no discretion to abuse; 
rather, that the costs sought by Checkrite are mandatory in nature, and that Judge 
Fratto erred as a matter of law, not of discretion. Again, statutory interpretation is a 
question of law, and questions of law are reviewed without deference to the trial 
court. Graham v. Davis County Solid Waste Management and Energy Recovery 
Special Service District, 1999 UT App. 136, 979 P.2d 363. 
IV. AMICUS'S ARGUMENT THAT THE PARTIES COULD 
CONTRACT FOR PAYMENT OTHER THAN AS PROVIDED BY 
STATUTE GOES AGAINST THE INTENT OF U.C.A. 7-15-1, AND 
PROMOTES BAD PUBLIC POLICY. 
Utah law specifically prevents anyone other than the holder of a bad check 
4
 A decision on the merits was final for the purposes of appeal. Taylor v. 
Hansen, 958 P.2d 923 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
5 
from recovering the damages and penalties under the statute. It is the intent of the 
legislature that all of the damages go to the holder of the bad check. If the holder 
has to pay a percentage, or even a flat rate, the holder does not receive the full 
amount as intended by the statute. The holder would make up the loss by raising 
prices, which is not good public policy. The statute is also intended to penalize the 
maker of the check by requiring that the make pay "all costs of collection", not the 
holder, not the attorney, not the court. That is why those items are specifically 
taxed against the maker. To do otherwise is to reduce the obligation and penalty 
against the maker, and is again bad public policy. 
Without a judgment, Checkrite cannot recover, the merchant cannot recover, 
and the maker walks away. The purpose of the statute is to make the bad actor pay, 
not the public. 
Historically, prior to the enactment in 1999 of the present statute, it has not 
been the practice of merchants or check collectors in Utah to contract as the 
Amicus suggests. The practice has been that the collector, as authorized by statute, 
recovers its costs of collection from the maker of the bad check. Any other 
practice is bad public policy, as the costs otherwise will be borne out in increased 
prices to the consumer. 
6 
V. The issue in this case is not abuse of discretion, as the Amicus asserts. 
As the Amicus has raised the issue of abuse of discretion specifically, 
Checkrite will address and dispose of it here. Despite the efforts of the Amicus to 
cloud and re-define the issues, the issue in this case is not abuse of discretion, 
rather it is one of failure to follow the clear language of the statute, which language 
make the awarding of "all costs of collection" mandatory and not discretionary. 
Judge Fratto did not have the discretion to disallow Checkrite's costs, and the 
District Court Judges in their collective authority did not have the authority to re-
write the statute. This is not a matter of abuse of discretion, rather, it is a matter of 
usurpation of legislative prerogative. What remains before this Court is the issue the 
Court itself has framed, and which the Court of Appeals has answered in Tholen v. 
Sandy City; 
What is the meaning of "all costs of collection" under Utah's Bad 
Check Law? "While we recognize that in the context of promissory 
notes, 'costs of collection,' as a term of art, can be taken to include 
attorney fees without expressly so stating, see Black's Law Dictionary 
312 (5th ed. 1979), such an interpretation is inapplicable in the context 
of statutory interpretation in Utah, especially in light of Section 7-15-
1(3), which demonstrates the Legislature does not have that 
understanding." Tholen, at 596, footnote 5. 
7 
CONCLUSION 
The issue in this matter is the definition of "all costs of collection", not abuse 
of discretion. The cases cited by the Amicus support Checkrite's position that 
where specific costs are authorized by U.C.A. 7-15-1, et seq, those costs should be 
awarded. The ruling by Judge Fratto based upon a memorandum from a limited 
number of District Judges was wrong as a matter of law, and should be reversed 
and remanded. 
Wherefore, Checkrite respectfully requests that the Court remand the matter 
to the District Court with instructions to allow the recovery of the collection costs of 
$20.07 per check as provided by statute. 
Respectfully Submitted; 
BENNETT & DeLONEY, P.C 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
CHECKRITE RECOVERY SERVICES, INC. 
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March 27, 2001 
The Honorable Mark Shurtleff 
Attorney General State of Utah 
Capitol Building, 2nd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Dear Mr. Shurtleff: 
The court has requested that I write you and invite your Consumer Division of the Utah 
Attorney General's Office to file an amicus curiae brief in support of the defendant, Deborah M. 
King, who is appearing pro se in a case before the Supreme Court, entitled CheckRite Recovery 
Services v. King, Case No. 20010006-SC . The issue in the case is what costs are allowed as 
"collection costs" under section 7-15-l(7)(b)(iii) Utah Code Ann. 
On January 10, 2000, six judges of the district court signed a policy memorandum 
directing that in the Murray, Sandy, and West Valley City Departments of the Third District 
Court default judgments under section 7-15-1, would include only the amount of the checks, 
interest, damages, costs of court, and attorney fees. Costs of collection would not be awarded in 
addition. 
Because defendant King is representing herself, the court wants to be sure that the issue is 
fully briefed and argued on both sides. 
The court will appreciate your considering this request and advising me whether you can 
participate. 
Pat H. Bartholomew 
Clerk of Court 
cc: Deborah M. King 
Doug McCallon, Esq. 
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